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ABSTRACT: The effects of climate change on agriculture raise major food security concerns. We use a 
global economy-wide model to assess the effects on farm product prices of expected yield changes. Also 
modelled is an expected adverse effect of higher temperatures and humidity in the tropics on the pro-
ductivity of unskilled workers in developing countries. Given the degrees of uncertainty about plausible 
effects of climate change, our modelling accounts for a range of yield productivity and labor shocks. The 
results entail consequences for international agricultural prices, national food consumption, self suffi-
ciency, net farm income and economic welfare.
KEYWORDS: Climate change, crop and labor productivity growth, global economy-wide model projections.
JEL classification: D58, F17, Q17, Q24, Q54.
Cambio climático y seguridad alimentaria al 2030: una perspectiva global 
de la economía en general
RESUMEN: Los efectos de variaciones climáticas sobre las actividades agrícolas han provocado pre-
ocupación acerca de los impactos en la seguridad alimentaria. Este estudio usa un modelo global de 
economía-general para evaluar los efectos de variaciones en la productividad de las cosechas, y una dis-
minución de la productividad laboral en los trópicos debido a incrementos en la temperatura y humedad 
en países menos desarrollados. Considerando el grado de incertidumbre acerca de los posibles efectos de 
las variaciones climáticas, nuestro estudio toma en cuenta rangos de efectos sobre la productividad agrí-
cola y laboral. Los resultados muestran consecuencias sobre los precios agrícolas mundiales, consumo 
nacional, auto-suficiencia, ingreso neto agrícola y bienestar económico.
PALABRAS CLAVES: Cambio climático, impactos productividad cultivos laboral, proyecciones 
globales económicas.
Clasificación JEL: D58, F17, Q17, Q24, Q54.
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1. Introduction
Following the upward spike in international prices of many primary commodities 
in 2008, and in light of on-going climate changes, policy makers and the general pu-
blic have once again become concerned about food security at both national and glo-
bal levels. Tough prices on international markets for food and energy raw materials 
came down quickly from their mid-2008 peaks, they rose again in 2010-11 and they 
remain high by historical standards. More than that, the trend in food prices has been 
noticeably upward over the past decade, in contrast to its downward trend over most 
of the 20th century; and, since the introduction of biofuel subsidies and mandates par-
ticularly in the US and EU a few years ago, food prices seem to be closely tracking 
fossil fuel prices – again in contrast to most of the second half of the 20th century 
(Figure 1).
While affluent people in high-income countries can cope with higher prices of 
farm products, the poorest households of those countries, and a far higher proportion 
of non-farm households in developing countries, suffer when food prices are high. 
Even some farm households can be worse off, for example those that produce predo-
minantly cash crops, the prices of which have not risen by as much as those of staple 
food crops, and those that earn the majority of their income from off-farm activities. 
Food crises can spark urban riots, as happened in numerous food-deficit developing 
countries in 2008 and 2011, and can even bring down governments. When followed 
by natural disasters (as with the earthquake in Haiti and the floods in Pakistan in 
2010), the outcome can be catastrophic.
Figure 1
International price indexes for food and fossil fuel energy raw materials, 
1960 to 2011a
a The 2011 data refer only to the first 2 months (January and February).
Source: World Bank, Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheets, see http://go.worldbank.org/5AT3JHWYU0).
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Climate change is expected to add to these food security concerns over the next 
two decades, and would do so even if global strategies to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions were to be introduced immediately. Warmer temperatures and altered 
precipitation patterns and thus water availability are expected, as are more-frequent 
extreme weather events. The associated crop productivity changes may be benefi-
cial initially in some cooler temperate regions in the higher latitudes and altitudes, but 
climate change is widely expected to reduce farm land and labor productivity in the 
tropics – and globally –, notwithstanding expected improvements in some cool areas 
(see, e.g., Cline, 2007; Kjellstrom et al., 2009; Mendelsohn, 2009; Nelson et al., 2010). 
What market, economic welfare and food self sufficiency effects migh these 
expected changes in productivity of global agricultural resources have? If they were 
progressively to lower world food output, the international food price trend would 
move onto a higher trajectory, depending on how each country and commodity mar-
ket responded to climate change. Thus most farm families in developing countries 
are not necessarily going to lose out economically from climate change: it is always 
possible that the change in the price of their output may more than offset any fall in 
their farm productivity. Even so, food security concerns may increase if food prices 
are higher and self-sufficiency ratios are lower, particularly in net food-importing 
developing countries (Hertel and Rosch, 2010).
This paper seeks to provide a sense of how climate change might impact on the 
world’s markets for farm products if there is no mitigation or adaptation other than 
in response to price changes. We make use of a global economy-wide model, the 
global GTAP model (Hertel, 1997), first to provide a projection of the world eco-
nomy to 2030 with no climate or policy changes, and then to compare that baseline 
with projections which incorporate assumed impacts of climate change over the next 
two decades on productivity (based on damage function analyses reported in recent 
studies). Only the two most direct biophysical changes that affect agriculture are 
modeled. The first is in crop land productivity, drawing on the interpretation of damage 
functions by Hertel et al. (2010), which in turn is informed by the careful assessment of 
the scientific evidence by Lobell and Burke (2008).1 The second relates to the impact of 
higher temperatures and humidity on the productivity of unskilled labor in the already 
hot and humid tropics, drawing on the interpretation of its debilitating effects by van 
der Mensbrugghe and Roson (2010) which in turn draws on Kjellstrom et al. (2009).
National and global economic welfare effects (equivalent variations of income) 
are also estimated in the GTAP model. Their magnitudes are shown to be small with 
respect to projected real income, suggesting that there must be other costs of climate 
change not examined here to warrant the sorts of major policy response being called 
for (such as carbon emission taxes and border tax adjustments). However, it needs 
to be kept in mind from the outset that we are imposing only that subset of shocks 
expected to come from climate change that affects farming most, and we are using a 
comparative static model that – unlike a dynamic stochastic model – cannot capture 
1 These authors define three productivity scenarios: low, medium and high. The low (high) productivity 
scenario is a world with rapid (slow) temperature increase, high (low) sensitivity of crops to warming and 
a lower (higher) bound of the CO2 fertilization effect. 
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the sporadic additional costs to farmers and others of more-frequent extreme weather 
events, such as floods, droughts, frosts, hail and wind.
Section 2 of the paper describe the GTAP model and how we use it to project 
the world economy to 2030 (the baseline scenario). Section 3 presents two main 
alternative scenarios for 2030, to represent expected features of climate change that 
directly affect agriculture: one involving just crop productivity changes, the other 
also allowing for changes in unskilled labor productivity in developing countries. We 
implement variations in the magnitude of these shocks to assess the robustness and li-
nearity of results. Like all such modelling, the results depend on various assumptions, 
so a number of caveats are discussed in Section 4 before the paper concludes with 
some implications for food security and farm policies.
2. Projecting a baseline to 2030 with the GTAP model
The standard GTAP model (Hertel, 1997) is perhaps the world’s most widely 
used economy-wide model for economy-wide global market analysis, in part due 
to its robust and explicit assumptions. In its simplest form, the model as used here 
is comparative static and assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale 
in production. The functional forms are nested constant elasticities of substitution 
(CES) production functions. Land and other natural resources, labor (skilled and 
unskilled), and produced physical capital substitute for one another in a value added 
aggregate, and composite intermediate inputs substitute for value-added at the next 
CES level in fixed proportions. Land is specific to agriculture in the GTAP database, 
and is allowed to be highly mobile between alternative agricultural uses. A Constant 
Elasticity of Transformation (CET) revenue function transforms land from one use 
to another. There is also a very low elasticity of transformation between alternative 
uses of other natural resources. In the default GTAP closure, labor and capital are 
assumed to be mobile across all uses within a country but immobile internationally. 
On the demand side there is a regional representative household whose expendi-
ture is governed by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate utility function which allocates net 
national expenditures across private, government, and saving activities. The greatest 
advantage of this regional household representation is the unambiguous indicator of 
economic welfare given by the regional utility function, expressed as an equivalent 
variation in income. Government demand across composite goods is determined by a 
Cobb-Douglas assumption (fixed budget shares). Private household demand is repre-
sented by a Constant Difference of Elasticities (CDE) functional form, which has the 
virtue of capturing the non-homothetic nature of private household demands as well 
as permitting the user to calibrate the model to specific own-price elasticities of de-
mand. For present purposes, we recalibrate the income elasticities of China and India 
to account for their projected very rapid income growth.
Bilateral international trade flows are handled through the Armington (1969) spe-
cification, by which products are differentiated by country of origin. These Arming-
ton elasticities are the same across regions but are sector-specific, and they are esti-
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mated at the disaggregated GTAP commodity level (Hertel et al., 2007). We follow 
the practice of many other GTAP users and deal with long-term changes by doubling 
these standard short-to-medium term elasticities. 
The standard macro-economic closure assumes that the levels of each region’s 
employment of each of the productive factors is unchanged in aggregate, and that 
the regional balance of trade is determined by the relationship between regional in-
vestment and savings, where foreign investment is allocated in fixed shares across 
regions so that it moves in line with global savings. This fixed shares mechanism, 
which could be interpreted as a partial long-run equilibrium, with international capi-
tal reallocation left out, is more predictable (conservative) than the standard rate of 
return closure.
The full GTAP 7.0 database comprises 113 regions in addition to the 57 sectors/
product groups, but to make the model more manageable we have aggregated it to 23 
sectors/product groups and 23 regions (see Annex Tables A1 and A2). It is initially 
calibrated to the year 2004. The standard GTAP protection database (see Narayanan 
and Walmsley, 2008) is altered to include a more complete set of estimates of distor-
tions in agricultural prices in developing countries, based on Valenzuela and Ander-
son (2008).2 Those distortion estimates suggest that, despite reforms in the past 25 
years, there was still a considerable range of industry assistance rates across commo-
dities and countries in 2004, including a strong anti-trade bias in national agricultural 
and trade policies for many developing countries. Furthermore, non-agricultural pro-
tectionism is still rife in some developing countries, and agricultural price supports in 
some high-income countries3 remain high.
To project the world economy to 2030 using this comparative static model, we 
assume policies as in 2004 and that the stock of agricultural land and mineral reser-
ves does not change in each region but that population, labor, capital and real GDP 
grow at the rates shown in Annex Table A3, from which the implied rates of total 
factor productivity and GDP per capita growth are derived as shown in the final two 
columns of that table.4 The exogenous growth rates are based on World Bank and 
OECD projections (see, e.g., van der Mensbrugghe and Roson, 2010; Duval and de 
2 That distortions database is documented fully in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) and is based on the 
methodology summarized in Anderson et al., 2008.
3 High-income countries are defined in this paper to include Russia and other East European and Cen-
tral Asian countries that are not members of EU27.
4 Economically exploitable mineral reserves are depleted each year but they are also added to through 
new discoveries and improvements in exploitation technologies. In recent decades those reserves have 
tended to increase rather than fall (BP, 2010), so our assumption of no change will project higher mineral 
and energy prices than would prevail if past reserves trends were to continue. Since 1990, arable land used 
for farming has decreased slightly (less than 2 percent per year) in high-income and transition countries, 
has changed little in South and Southeast Asia and in North Africa and the Middle East, but has grown 
slightly (at less than 2 percent per year) in East Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa (Deininger 
and Byerlee, 2011, Table 1.1 based on FAOSTAT data). Had those rates of change been assumed to con-
tinue for another two decades, in place of our assumption of no change in land area, the aggregate results 
reported below would have changed only slightly.
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la Maisonneuve, 2009).5 The rate of total factor productivity growth is assumed to 
be the same in each of the non-primary sectors, and to be somewhat higher in the 
primary sectors as detailed in the footnote to Annex Table A3. Higher productivity 
growth rates for primary activities were characteristic of the latter half of the 20th 
century (Martin and Mitra, 2001), and are necessary in this projection if real interna-
tional prices of primary products (relative to the aggregate change for all products) 
are to follow a flat trend.6 
The differences across regions in rates of growth of endowments and total factor 
productivity, and the fact that sectors differ in their relative factor intensities, en-
sure that the structures of production, consumption and trade across sectors within 
countries, and also between countries, are going to be different in 2030 than in 2004. 
Those changes are reported in detail in a companion background paper by Valen-
zuela and Anderson (2011). The faster-growing developing countries (especially 
those of Asia) take up a considerably larger share of the projected global economy 
over the next two decades. Their share of world GDP rises from 20 percent in 2004 
to 30 percent by 2030. 
The developing country share of global exports of all products increases from 
just under one-third in 2004 to a little over one-half by 2030. China’s shares alone 
grow from 4 to 8 percent of global GDP and from 7 to 16 percent of global exports. 
China’s export growth is largely at the expense of high-income countries rather than 
any developing country regions. By contrast the developing country share of global 
exports of agricultural product falls slightly, from 33 to 27 percent between 2004 and 
2030, while the developing country share of global farm imports rises dramatically, 
from 32 to 56 percent. Recall, though, that we are assuming no change in agricultural 
or trade policies over the projection period.7 
With real prices of primary products not falling as they did in the 20th century, 
the normal transition from primary to manufacturing and service sector activities 
occurs less rapidly in our projection to 2030, at least for developing countries. Sec-
toral shares of national exports and imports, however, change somewhat more. For 
developing countries, farm and other primary products become less important in their 
overall exports and more important in their overall imports, and conversely for high-
5 Since completing this study, a new set of preliminary projections to 2050 have been released by CEPII 
in Paris (Fouré et al., 2010). The exogenous assumptions in the present study are broadly in line with that 
CEPII study.
6 The reason for choosing that calibration, as explained in Valenzuela and Anderson (2011), is to be 
consistent with the World Bank projections over the next two decades in van der Mensbrugghe and Roson 
(2010). An alternative in which primary product prices fall, as projected in GTAP-based projection studies 
in the late 20th century (e.g., Anderson et al., 1997), is considered unlikely over the next two decades given 
the slowdown in agricultural R&D investment since 1990 and its consequent delayed slowing of farm 
productivity growth (Alston et al., 2010). Our assumed total factor productivity growth for agriculture 
between 2004 and 2030 of around 2.0 and 2.4 percent for high-income and developing countries compares 
with estimated rates for 1967 to 1992 of 3.4 percent for high-income countries and between 1.8 and 2.6 
percent for developing countries (Martin and Mitra, 2001).
7 Perhaps a more likely scenario, especially for rapidly growing Asia, would be a steady rise in agricul-
tural protection to slow the decline in food self sufficiency – as has happened over the past 50 years in the 
most advanced Asian economies (Anderson, 2009).
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income countries (Tables 9 and 10 of Valenzuela and Anderson, 2011). Thus in the 
baseline projection agricultural self-sufficiency in developing countries falls from 98 
percent in 2004 to 93 percent by 2030, with most of that fall concentrated in East and 
South Asia (first two columns of Table 1). Even so, the developing countries’ share 
of global agricultural GDP rises from 50 percent in 2004 to a projected 65 percent by 
2030. Their shares of GDP from other primary products and from manufactures also 
rise, from 54 to 63 percent and from 25 to 39 percent, respectively (Table 11 of Va-
lenzuela and Anderson, 2011), reflecting the much higher GDP growth rate assumed 
for developing countries, particularly China and, in the case of agriculture, also India.
3. Alternative scenarios for 2030 
Given the baseline projections summarized above, we use the GTAP model to 
simulate the market and welfare effects, first of the direct impact of climate change 
on crop yields in different parts of the world, and then also of the projected impacts 
of climate change on unskilled labor productivity in tropical developing countries.
3.1 Crop productivity effects
The direct impacts of climate change on crop productivity have been examined by 
many analysts, and there still remains considerable uncertainty as to even their sign 
let alone their magnitude (Gornall et al., 2010). Nonetheless, for present purposes we 
adopt the rates for the period from 2004 to 2030 used by Hertel, Burke and Lobell 
(2010) following their extensive review of the relevant scientific literature. We make 
only a few minor adjustments, e.g., for Australia so as to be more consistent with the 
Garnaut Climate Change Review (Garnaut, 2008; see also Gunasekera et al., 2007). 
Those yield shocks are summarized in Annex Table A4. They represent a most-likely 
or medium case, along with a low-productivity and a high-productivity case. These 
estimates are intended to depict a range of plausible effects, and can be thought of as 
the 5th and 95th percentile values in a distribution of potential yield impacts (Hertel et 
al., 2010).
There are several points worth noting about those shocks. First, there is a wide 
range of effects between the low and high scenarios for each region. Second, they 
tend to be positive in all but the low crop productivity scenario for high-income 
temperate countries (except for coarse grains). Third, they are generally negative for 
developing countries except in the high productivity scenario. And fourth, those yield 
shocks are very small over a long 26 years period, when compared with the annual 
productivity growth rates reported in Annex Table A3. More than that, farm land is 
projected to account throughout the next two decades for less than one-tenth of GDP 
in all but the most agrarian of developing economies and to be below 2 percent in high-
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income countries and globally (Table 13 of Valenzuela and Anderson, 2011).8 Hence 
the net economic effects of these direct crop yield impacts of climate change will ne-
cessarily be small in proportional terms – even though they may have large impacts 
on very seriously affected regions within some countries, including the hot irrigated 
horticultural and rice- and cotton-growing regions of Australia and the United States.
The effects of these climate change-induced direct crop productivity impacts on 
national agricultural self sufficiency for the sector as a whole in 2030, as compared 
with the baseline in that year, amount to no more than 2 percentage points except for 
Australia, New Zealand and Argentina (Table 1). The effects on production, con-
sumption and trade, summarized in percentage terms in Table 2, are somewhat larger 
than the effects on self sufficiency, but are still relatively small overall. By 2030 the 
projected volume of agricultural output may be expected to shrink by no more than 2 
percent in developing countries in the medium case. In the low-productivity case the 
adverse effects are larger, ranging down to -5.6 percent for India and -6.5 percent for 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
TABLE 1
Effects of economic growth, crop yield and labor productivity changes due to 
climate change on agricultural self sufficiency from 2004 to 2030
Regions Base 2004
Base 
2030
Crop productivity shock Unskilled labor productivity shock Medium Crop and -3% unskilled 
labor productivity shock
Low Med High -3% -6%
USA 103 112 111 112 112 112 112 112
Canada 108 119 121 120 119 119 119 120
EU27 and EFTA 94 101 104 102 100 101 101 102
Russia 89 90 89 90 91 90 90 90
Rest of EE/C Asia 100 100 102 101 101 100 100 101
Australia 138 152 159 154 151 153 152 154
New Zealand 161 172 179 174 169 173 172 174
Japan 83 83 84 84 83 83 83 84
Korea 81 80 80 82 83 79 79 82
HK/Sing/Taiwan 66 65 66 66 66 65 65 65
China 97 90 88 89 90 90 90 89
Indonesia 95 84 84 84 88 84 84 84
Malaysia 60 45 42 45 47 46 45 45
Thailand 112 98 95 97 98 97 98 97
Rest of East Asia 100 90 87 89 90 89 90 89
8 The land’s share of agricultural GDP is projected to rise by 2030, however. This is in contrast to what 
T.W. Schultz (1951) anticipated, but is not inconsistent with the developments expected over the coming 
decades as reviewed, for example, by Hertel (2010).
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Regions Base 2004
Base 
2030
Crop productivity shock Unskilled labor productivity shock Medium Crop and -3% unskilled 
labor productivity shock
Low Med High -3% -6%
Rest of S. Asia 96 86 84 85 86 86 86 85
Argentina 142 146 155 145 141 145 146 145
Brazil 123 132 134 132 130 133 132 132
Rest of L America 102 95 93 94 95 95 95 94
M. East/N. Africa 84 83 83 83 83 82 82 83
South Africa 107 115 117 115 112 116 115 115
Rest of SS Africa 102 97 93 96 98 97 97 96
High-income 
countries 103 112 114 112 111 112 112 112
Developing coun-
tries 98 93 91 92 93 92 92 92
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Authors’ simulations.
Typically, the farm gate price of products is projected to move in the opposite 
direction to farm production in response to these yield shocks though, and to a grea-
ter extent. For the sector globally, the effect on production may be expected to be in 
the range of -1.3 to 0.6 percent whereas for farmgate prices the range is 6.7 to -2.4 
percent (corresponding to low to high productivity shocks, respectively). There is an 
even greater effect on agricultural value added (which also takes account of changes 
in input prices): at global level it may be expected to change by between -8.6 and 3.6 
percent (last row of Table 2).
The volume of farm products consumed in developing countries may be expected 
to fall in all but the high productivity case. The extent of the change is less than for 
production though, because incomes earned from non-farm activities will not fall as 
much as those from farming.
The difference between the production and consumption effects is the effect on 
trade. Since most developing countries are reasonably close to self-sufficiency in farm 
products (see Table 1), the effect on their trade would be an amplification of the effect 
on production or consumption were it not for the fact that in most cases these two latter 
effects are both negative and so are somewhat offsetting (which is why self sufficiency 
levels are projected to change so little in Table 1). Hence agricultural imports of develo-
ping countries increase only slightly in the medium case, and actually fall slightly in the 
high productivity case. In the low productivity case, however, some countries would 
see a sizeable increase in their food imports (final columns of Table 2). In that case it 
would be high-income countries whose farm exports would increase (by 10 percent). 
TABLE 1 (continued)
Effects of economic growth, crop yield and labor productivity changes due to 
climate change, on agricultural self sufficiency, from 2004 to 2030
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The aggregate price of agricultural products on international markets is expected 
to be higher by 2030 in all but the high productivity case. The most extreme change is 
for coarse grains (mostly maize), whose price is projected to be 16 percent higher in 
the low case and 4 percent higher in the medium case (Table 3). Even higher results 
are expected from some other studies, however. A recent IFPRI study, for example, 
projects price effects of climate changes by 2050 of between 20 and 50 percent (Nel-
son et al., 2010).
TABLE 3
Effects on agricultural prices in international markets of crop 
and labor productivity changes due to climate change, 2030. 
(Percent deviation from baseline in projected year)
Sectors
Crop productivity shock Unskilled labor productivity shock Medium Crop and -3% unskilled 
labor productivity shockLow Med High -3% -6%
Rice 4.5 1.0 -1.9 0.4 0.8 1.4
Wheat 6.6 -0.3 -4.9 0.1 0.2 -0.2
Coarse grains 15.9 4.3 -2.3 0.1 0.3 4.4
Fruit & veg 6.8 0.4 -3.7 0.2 0.4 0.6
Oilseeds 7.4 0.2 -4.7 0.1 0.2 0.3
Sugar 0.8 0.1 -0.5 0.3 0.7 0.4
Cotton 9.3 1.1 -4.4 0.0 0.0 1.1
Other crops 6.7 0.2 -4.3 0.2 0.4 0.3
Beef/sheep 1.7 0.2 -0.8 0.2 0.5 0.5
Pork/chicken 1.6 0.1 -0.9 0.2 0.5 0.3
Dairy 0.8 0.1 -0.5 0.2 0.4 0.3
All agriculture & food 4.1 0.4 -2.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Forestry -1.0 -0.2 0.3 -0.3 -0.6 -0.5
Coal 0.5 0.2 0.1 -3.1 -6.1 -2.9
Oil -0.5 -0.1 0.1 -0.8 -1.6 -0.9
Gas -0.5 -0.2 0.0 0.6 1.2 0.4
Minerals nec -0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.7 -1.4 -0.7
Fish and processed food 1.2 0.2 -0.5 0.3 0.6 0.4
Light manufacturing -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.3
Heavy manufacturing -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Utilities & construction -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.3
Electricity, gas distrib. -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
Transport -0.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.2
Other services -0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.2
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The impacts of these price and quantity changes on overall national economic 
welfare are summarized in Table 4. For the world as a whole, the negative impact in 
the medium case is for a tiny fall of 0.03 percent of projected real income by 2030. 
That aggregate conceals larger proportional changes at country level, especially for 
developing countries, but even so they appear to be very minor (0.1 percent of pro-
jected real income for that group, and 0.3 percent for India). These national economic 
welfare effects come not only from the factor productivity shocks themselves but 
also from the change in the country’s international terms of trade and the impact of 
producer and consumer responses to them on the resource efficiency costs of distor-
tionary policies such as tariffs and subsidies. The terms of trade effects are non-trivial 
and for some countries they are larger than (and in some cases opposite in sign to) the 
direct crop productivity effect.
These projected changes from the assumed crop productivity effects of climate 
change are just one of the influences expected from temperature and humidity chan-
ges over the coming decades. We turn now to an additional expected influence, na-
mely the debilitating impact on unskilled workers in developing countries which van 
der Mensbrugghe and Roson (2010) indicate could be far more important.
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TABLE 4
Effects on national economic welfare of crop yield and labor productivity changes.
(2004 US$ million, equivalent variation of income from baseline in 2030)
Regions Crop productivity shock
Unskilled labor 
productivity shock
Medium crop and -3% unskilled 
labor productivity shock
Low Med High -3% -6% in US $m as % of GDP
USA 195 647 371 -1642 -3239 -1019 -0.01
Canada 431 58 -193 -404 -799 -351 -0.03
EU27 and EFTA -7002 -555 5054 -3426 -6846 -3948 -0.03
Russia -1643 -100 925 -2208 -4401 -2302 -0.23
Rest of EE/C Asia 351 897 1213 -645 -1291 236 0.02
Australia 1612 375 -260 -1528 -2994 -1170 -0.11
New Zealand 436 85 -137 -4 -6 80 0.05
Japan -3574 -464 1709 110 200 -340 -0.01
Korea -1074 7 823 -11829 -23907 -11827 -0.80
HK/Sing/Taiwan -788 -27 661 -8254 -16699 -8282 -0.70
China -30524 -9825 4921 -37424 -76113 -46932 -1.03
Indonesia -1182 -311 3927 -5070 -10232 -5373 -0.91
Malaysia -487 -85 273 -2724 -5503 -2806 -0.92
Thailand -1261 -277 455 290 582 12 0.00
Rest of East Asia -1869 -484 577 -3179 -6428 -3653 -0.93
India -22411 -5812 7094 -11972 -24330 -17653 -1.05
Rest of S. Asia -5172 -1060 2033 -3460 -7005 -4500 -1.05
Argentina 1072 -27 -531 -88 -175 -118 -0.05
Brazil 1061 -11 -641 -10189 -20562 -10204 -0.97
Rest of L America -5331 -1057 1367 -22026 -44464 -23057 -0.91
M. East/N. Africa -3560 -253 2019 -14258 -28798 -14503 -0.74
South Africa 221 22 -60 -392 -761 -374 -0.11
Rest of SS Africa -6447 -1398 1688 -6226 -12591 -7576 -1.17
High-income countries -9194 943 8682 -9748 -19377 -8814 -0.02
Developing countries -77751 -20598 24606 -136802 -276986 -156846 -0.88
World -86945 -19657 33289 -146550 -296363 -165659 -0.28
Source: Authors’ simulations.
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3.2 Effects on unskilled labor productivity
Since temperatures and humidity are expected to rise from already very high 
levels in most tropical developing countries, the productivity of workers in those 
countries (especially those involved in manual farm work) is expected to fall in the 
absence of counter measures (Kjellstrom et al., 2009). By contrast, in high-income 
countries the temperature rises will generally be from cool or at most moderate rather 
than from high current levels.
We follow van der Mensbrugghe and Roson (2010) and rely on Kjellstrom et al., 
2009) in attempting to simulate the effect of climate change on all unskilled workers 
in tropical and desertified developing countries, by implementing a shock to unski-
lled labor productivity in both the agricultural and non-farm sectors. Kjellstrom et al. 
project the magnitude of that shock by the 2020s under the IPCC’s A2 scenario as 
between 3 and 7.5 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa, 4.9 percent for South Asia, and 
7.5 percent for Central America. To err on the side of caution, we assume a 3 percent 
decline in unskilled labor productivity by 2030 in all developing countries other than 
the relatively temperate Argentina, Korea, South Africa and Taiwan and the most 
affluent (Hong Kong and Singapore). To test the linearity of the key effects of such a 
shock, we also provide results for a 6 percent shock.
It turns out that the effects of this shock on agricultural markets are highly linear, 
which allows the reader to assess the impacts of their own alternative-sized labor shock 
from climate change simply by factoring up or down the numbers presented below.
For developing countries as a group, the generally negative impact of this shock 
on the volume of agricultural production is somewhat larger than the effect of the me-
dium crop productivity shock alone. There is an even larger difference in the decline 
in consumption of farm products (Table 5), so the impact on global agricultural trade 
is slightly muted. The developing country share of global exports (imports) of farm 
products may still be expected to be lower (higher) by 2030 than in the absence of the 
two core productivity shocks (the medium crop one and the -3 percent labor one), but 
the change will be greater (smaller) than if only crop productivity was affected. 
The welfare effects are negative and considerably bigger than in the yield shock 
scenarios, because the shock to unskilled labor is non-trivial and applies to all sectors 
of developing countries, not just to agriculture. Globally these effects amount to a 
loss of $147 billion per year by 2030 for a -3 percent labor shock (and $296 billion, 
or roughly double, for a -6 percent shock), which compares to a global loss of just 
$20 billion for the medium crop productivity shock. Almost all of the global welfare 
loss is felt by developing countries(Table 4). 
The self-sufficiency numbers shown in Table 1 refer to all agricultural products, 
and so do not necessarily relate closely to concerns about staple food import depen-
dence. A better indicator of the latter is grain self-sufficiency, results for which are 
reported in Table 6. They too seem to be affected very little by the climate change 
shocks considered here. Even when disaggregated into individual crops such as rice 
and wheat, the scenarios differ little in their self sufficiency ratios for most develo-
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ping countries. That does not mean, however, that food security is unaffected. This 
is because when food production falls in developing countries so too does aggregate 
income, all else being equal; and thus less food can be afforded, so consumption falls 
as well – as shown in Table 2.
TABLE 6
Grain self sufficiency, 2004 and 2030 baseline and after crop and labor productivity 
losses from climate change. (Production as a percentage of domestic consumption) 
Regions
Baseline With climate change
2004 2030 Medium Crop productivity shock
Medium Crop and -3% unskilled labor 
productivity shock
USA 163 183 178 178
Canada 280 357 360 359
EU27 and EFTA 94 107 109 109
Russia 99 101 102 102
Rest of EE/C Asia 95 94 95 95
Australia 334 401 415 414
New Zealand 75 81 81 81
Japan 83 81 81 81
Korea 83 79 80 80
HK/Sing/Taiwan 64 61 63 63
China 98 95 95 95
Indonesia 94 92 91 91
Malaysia 43 36 36 36
Thailand 131 115 114 114
Rest of East Asia 98 90 90 90
India 103 102 102 102
Rest of South Asia 98 92 92 92
Argentina 378 447 433 429
Brazil 99 100 99 99
Rest of L America 80 77 77 77
M. East/N. Africa 64 62 62 62
South Africa 84 110 111 110
Rest of SS Africa 77 78 79 79
High-income countries 104 118 119 119
Developing countries 93 90 90 90
WORLD 100 100 100 100
Source: Authors’ simulations.
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3.3. Combined effects of crop and unskilled labor productivity shocks
When those two sets of shocks are combined, the effects are linear for most but 
not all indicators. That is, the proportional changes in an indicator can often be sim-
ply added. To illustrate this, we show on the right-hand side of Tables 1, 3 and 4-6 
the combined effect of the medium crop shock and the -3 percent labor shock. 
Perhaps the most important of those combined effects are those summarized in 
Figure 2, which shows the three crop scenarios together with the -3 percent labor 
scenario. International agricultural prices could rise by as much as 4.2 percent, or fall 
by 1.8 percent, but in the medium case would rise by only 0.6 percent. This affects 
countries’ terms of trade (and hence incomes) in different ways, depending on their 
net exports of the various products, The volume of consumption of farm products in 
developing countries falls in all cases except the high crop productivity case (where 
the net effect is virtually zero but see Table 5 for national details), which is not good 
news for food security in those countries. Part of the reason for lower consumption is 
the fall in net farm incomes in those countries of 1.8 percent in the medium case and 
8 percent in the low crop productivity case: only in the high crop productivity case 
does agricultural value added rise in developing countries as a group (by 3.6 percent). 
Overall economic welfare falls for developing countries in all three cases illustra-
ted in Figure 2, by between 0.6 and 1.2 percent of real income (see last columns of 
Table 4 for national details). By contrast, high-income countries may be expected to 
be affected far less – and not to lose at all in the high crop productivity case. To put 
these welfare effects in perspective, we ran another simulation in which import tariffs 
on all goods and all agricultural subsidies were eliminated in 2030 (having left these 
distortions unchanged in the core simulation from 2004 to 2030): the welfare effects 
of such an extreme policy reform would be roughly enough to offset the effects on 
developing country welfare of the shocks summarized in Figure 2 (a 1.0 percent gain 
to developing countries’ welfare and a 0.5 percent gain globally). 
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FIGURE 2 
Some effects of a 3% decrease in unskilled labor productivity and low, medium and 
high crop yield productivity shocks on international agricultural prices, consump-
tion of farm products, net farm incomes, and national economic welfare, 2030
Source: Authors’ simulations.
4.  Caveats
The above analysis is partial in several respects. First, it examines the effects of 
just two of the many sets of impacts that climate changes are expected to have on the 
global economy. The study by van der Mensbrugghe and Roson (2010), for example, 
also takes into account the effects on energy demand, water availability, tourism and 
sea level rise. Not surprisingly, therefore, they get a higher impact of climate change 
on global economic welfare, of -1.8 percent by 2050. Incidentally, they also compare 
that with their estimate of the welfare effect of freeing trade policies globally by 
2050, which is +0.9 percent according to their global model. 
Second, we analyze the effects only to 2030. The effects of climate change are 
expected to become more severe in subsequent decades, however, so in the absence 
of mitigation they could become much greater in the remaining two-thirds of the 21st 
century than presented above for 2030. This is supported by the dynamic simulations 
to 2100 generated by Roson and van der Mensbrugghe (2010).
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Third, the nature of each simulated shock obviously determines the size of its 
effects. The medium crop productivity shocks that we model mostly help farm output 
in higher latitudes over the next two decades and hurt it in many parts of the tropics. 
The net effect in our case is virtually no aggregate global agricultural output change 
by 2030: between 0.6 and -1.3 percent. By contrast, van der Mensbrugghe and Roson 
(2010) assume larger positive shocks in temperate farm regions and smaller nega-
tive shocks in the tropics and so project a small net global economic welfare gain 
from changes in crop productivity. They also adopt a damage function approach to 
capture the effect of temperature rise on labor productivity (based on such studies 
as Kjellstrom et al., 2009), in contrast to our simpler homogenous exogenous labor 
shock for tropical countries. More sophisticated damage functions with respect to 
crop productivity also could be adopted, especially now that the GTAP database is 
being enhanced to enable better modelling of land use changes (see Hertel, 2010) and 
of the impact of changes in water availability in irrigated versus non-irrigated areas 
(see Calzadilla et al., 2010). Given the great uncertainty associated with the magni-
tude – and in some cases even the sign of potential shocks, our results simply show 
some ranges, and leave it to future analytical work to include likelihood probabilities 
and explore complementarities in climatic and agent-based modeling.9 An important 
feature of the GTAP economic model, however, is that many of the key results of 
a shock tend to be linear, in the sense that if the shock was 10 percent greater, the 
effects also would be about one-tenth greater.
Fourth, the standard comparative static version of the GTAP model used in the 
present study does not capture the complexity of energy markets. In particular, there 
are no biofuels markets, so the linkage that has recently emerged between biofuel 
crops and fossil fuels is not built into the projections. Modellers have certainly begun 
incorporating elements of that linkage (see, e.g., Golub et al., 2010, Hertel and Beck-
man, 2011), but there is still the challenge of anticipating how governments might al-
ter biofuel subsidies and mandates over the next 20 years (given the newness of many 
of those policies and the uncertainty still surrounding the net environmental benefits 
of such support for biofuel producers).  
Fifth, as mentioned at the outset of this paper, the debilitating impact on welfare 
and food security from extreme weather events is not captured by the comparative 
static model that we have employed. More frequent extreme weather events such as 
floods, droughts, frosts, hail and wind can affect all sectors but are especially dama-
ging to farm incomes whenever and wherever they strike – and not linearly, accor-
ding to a new study of weather-driven maize yield variability in Africa (Lobell et al., 
2011). Analysis of the welfare effects of climate change ought to recognise these in-
come distributional consequences, particularly on the poor. Economy-wide modelers 
are only now beginning to focus on these possible poverty consequences (see, e.g., Her-
tel et al., 2010), and to make their models stochastic (e.g., Hertel and Beckman, 2011). 
9 A forthcoming study by Scealy et al. (2011) draws on this information in an integrated assessment 
modeling exercise that estimates the range of grain self sufficiency ratios expected for each country in 
2050. Even when projecting over four decades their self-sufficiency ranges are rather narrow, so they 
would be even narrower in just two decades’ time
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What is also required is to recognize that if international food price fluctuations in-
crease because of more extreme weather events, so too will the welfare costs of govern-
ment efforts to use trade measures to insulate their domestic markets from border price 
fluctuations (Martin and Anderson, 2012).
Finally, we assume throughout that policies are unchanged through the projection 
period, and in particular that no new mitigation strategies or technologies are adop-
ted to slow climate change; nor are trade, subsidy or tax policies changed. This is an 
obvious area for extending the analysis. If a carbon tax was gradually phased in by 
all countries, for example, climate change would presumably eventually slow down. 
However, this would have little impact before 2030, and meanwhile that set of car-
bon taxes would alter the international competitiveness of various industries around 
the world. Carbon-intensive industrial sectors such as China’s would be likely to lose 
their comparative advantage, thereby making China’s farmers more competitive. And 
China might not be able to avoid that outcome simply by not adopting a carbon tax, 
because in that case other countries that have adopted such a tax may impose border 
tax adjustments on goods imported from China (Mattoo et al., 2009a,b) . One effect 
of pricing greenhouse gases, however, is that it would provide landowners with miti-
gation opportunities that would further alter the markets for and national comparative 
advantages in farm products (Golub et al., 2009). In particular, if this leads to land 
being taken out of agriculture for re-forestation to sequester carbon, food prices could 
potentially become much higher.
5. Implications for food security and farm policies
Given the above caveats, it would of course be premature to draw implications for 
agricultural, trade and climate change policies from the empirical results presented in 
this paper. The results are presented simply to illustrate some of the ways in which 
one or two of the shocks expected from on-going climate change can affect agricul-
tural markets directly or indirectly, and thereby also economic welfare. When those 
effects are expected by 2030 to be positive in some countries and negative in others, 
as in the case of farm products, the net impact on world food prices and hence real 
incomes of both farm and nonfarm households in the decades ahead can only be de-
termined with the use of a global economy-wide model projected forward.
In terms of global food security, our findings indicate that the impacts of climate 
change are less pessimistic than some earlier studies. One of the most widely cited is 
by Cline (2007), who predicts that by the 2080s, even with carbon fertilization, agri-
cultural output will be 8 percent lower in developing countries, 8 percent higher in 
high-income countries, and 3 percent lower globally. These larger magnitudes refer 
to five decades later than the above projections though, so they may not be inconsis-
tent with our findings for 2030 if indeed it is not until the middle half of the present 
century that the effects of climate change on agriculture accelerate. A more recent 
study by Nelson et al., (2010, Table 2.2) suggests that climate change will cause real 
international prices of grain to be between one-fifth and one-third higher in 2050 than 
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they would be without the climate changes expected in the first half of this century. 
Again those results for two decades later may not be inconsistent with our findings 
for 2030.10 And even if these larger results turn out to be excessive, the policy respon-
ses proposed by Nelson et al. (2010) to deal with the possible food security concerns 
that they raise may well be wise precautionary measures. This is especially the case 
for expanding agricultural R&D, since there is in any case considerable underin-
vestment in that activity in most developing countries (Alston et al., 2010), If such 
investments reduce the perceived need by governments to alter border measures to 
maintain food self sufficiency or avoid transmitting fluctuations in international pri-
ces to their domestic market, it will be doubly beneficial to food security in the rest 
of the world.
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Annex
TABLE A1
Aggregations of regionsa in the GTAP model
Regions-Aggregation Comprising GTAP regions
1 USA United States of America; Rest of North America
2 Canada Canada
3 EU27 and EFTA
Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; 
Germany; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; 
Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; United Kingdom; 
Switzerland; Norway; Rest of EFTA; Bulgaria; Romania
4 Russia Russian Federation
5 Rest of Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Albania; Belarus; Croatia; Ukraine; Rest of Eastern Europe; Rest of Europe; Kazakh-
stan; Kyrgyzstan; Rest of Former Soviet Union; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Georgia; Iran 
Islamic Republic of; Turkey
6 Australia Australia
7 New Zealand New Zealand
8 Japan Japan
9 Korea Korea
10 Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan Hong Kong; Taiwan; Singapore
11 China China
12 Indonesia Indonesia
13 Malaysia Malaysia
14 Thailand Thailand
15 Rest of East Asia
Cambodia; Lao People’s Democratic Rep.; Myanmar; Philippines; Viet Nam; Rest of 
Southeast Asia, Rest of Oceania; Rest of East Asia
16 India India
17 Rest of South Asia Bangladesh; Pakistan; Sri Lanka; Rest of South Asia
18 Argentina Argentina
19 Brazil Brazil
20 Rest of Latin America
Mexico; Bolivia; Chile; Colombia; Ecuador; Paraguay; Peru; Uruguay; Venezuela; 
Rest of South America; Costa Rica; Guatemala; Nicaragua; Panama; Rest of Central 
America; Caribbean
21 Middle East and North Africa Rest of Western Asia; Egypt; Morocco; Tunisia; Rest of North Africa
22 South Africa South Africa
23 Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa
Nigeria; Senegal; Rest of Western Africa; Central Africa; South Central Africa; 
Ethiopia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mauritius; Mozambique; Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia; 
Zimbabwe; Rest of Eastern Africa; Botswana; Rest of Southern African Customs Union 
a Regions 1 to 8 are categorized in this paper as High-income Countries, the rest (regions 9 to 23) as Developing Coun-
tries. Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe and Central Asia are included in the first group because they share a relati-
vely cool climate and have the same expected changes in crop yields as Western Europe to 2030.
Source: Authors’ aggregation derived from GTAP database (www.gtap.org).
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TABLE A2
Aggregations of sectors in the GTAP model
Sectors-Aggregation Comprising GTAP sectors
1 Rice Paddy rice; Processed rice
2 Wheat Wheat
3 Coarse grains Cereal grains nec
4 Fruit & veg Vegetables, fruit, nuts
5 Oilseeds Oil seeds, Vegetable oils and fats
6 Sugar Sugar cane, sugar beet; Sugar
7 Cotton Plant-based fibers
8 Other crops Crops nec
9 Cattle/sheep products Cattle,sheep,goats,horses; Meat of cattle, sheep, goats, horses; Wool, silk-worm cocoons
10 Pigs/chickens products Animal products nec; Meat products nec
11 Dairy Raw milk; Dairy products
12 Forestry Forestry
13 Coal Coal
14 Oil Oil
15 Gas Gas
16 Minerals nec Minerals nec
17 Fish and processed food Fishing; Food products nec; Beverages and tobacco products
18 Light manufacturing
Textiles; Wearing apparel; Leather products, Wood products; Paper products, 
publishing; Metal products; Motor vehicles and parts; Transport equipment nec; 
Manufactures nec
19 Heavy manufacturing Petroleum, coal products; Chemical,rubber,plastic prods; Mineral products nec; Ferrous metals; Metals nec; Electronic equipment; Machinery and equipment nec
20 Utilities and construction Water; Construction; Trade
21 Electricity and gas distribution Electricity; Gas manufacture, distribution
22 Transport Transport nec; Sea transport; Air transport
23 Other services Communication; Financial services nec; Insurance; Business services nec; Recreation and other services; PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Education; Dwellings
Source: Authors’ aggregation derived from GTAP database (www.gtap.org).
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TABLE A3 
Assumed annual rates of growth in factor endowments and real GDP, and im-
plied total factor productivity and real GDP per capita growth rates, 
from 2004 to 2030a. (Percent per year)
Regions Popul-ation
Unskilled 
labor
Skilled 
labor
Capital
Real 
GDP
Implied 
TFPa
Implied realGDP
per capita
USA 0.7 0.8 -0.2 3.2 2.6 1.4 1.9
Canada 0.4 0.4 -0.6 3.1 2.6 1.2 2.2
EU27 and EFTA -0.1 0.0 -0.7 1.9 1.9 1.2 2.0
Russia -0.6 -0.7 -1.0 3.2 3.2 1.2 3.8
Rest E. Europe/C. Asia 0.6 0.7 1.4 3.9 4.1 1.2 3.5
Australia 0.6 0.8 -0.2 3.7 3.4 1.5 2.8
New Zealand 0.7 1.0 0.0 3.6 3.4 1.2 2.7
Japan -0.3 -0.7 -1.4 2.3 1.4 1.0 1.7
Korea 0.3 -0.4 2.0 4.9 4.7 1.9 4.4
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan 0.4 0.2 0.6 4.9 4.5 1.8 4.1
China 0.6 0.5 4.5 6.0 6.0 2.2 5.4
Indonesia 1.1 1.3 3.7 4.8 5.1 1.6 4.0
Malaysia 1.3 1.5 5.0 5.7 5.7 1.6 4.3
Thailand 0.5 0.1 2.0 4.0 4.7 1.7 4.2
Rest of East Asia 1.2 1.5 2.9 4.1 4.4 1.2 3.2
India 1.1 1.5 3.0 5.9 5.8 1.8 4.7
Rest of South Asia 1.7 2.2 3.1 5.0 5.1 1.4 3.4
Argentina 0.9 0.3 2.9 2.7 3.4 1.5 2.5
Brazil 1.0 0.9 2.3 3.3 3.7 1.3 2.6
Rest of Latin America 1.3 1.6 2.9 3.5 4.0 1.0 2.6
Middle East/N. Africa 1.6 2.0 2.4 4.1 4.6 1.0 2.9
South Africa 0.4 0.7 0.5 1.9 3.3 1.8 2.9
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa 2.0 2.5 2.4 3.8 4.6 1.0 2.6
High-income countries 0.2 0.2 -0.5 2.6 2.2 1.2 2.0
Developing countries 1.2 1.4 2.9 4.6 4.7 1.5 3.5
World 1.0 1.2 1.1 3.1 2.9 1.3 1.9
a Additional primary sectoral TFP shocks (percent per year) from 2004 to 2030: coal 2.1, oil 1.9, gas 1.3, mineral 
resources 1.2, agriculture and food 0.9 (except cotton 1.3), forestry 1.2.
Source: Authors’ compilation drawing on World Bank and OECD projections.
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